This paper takes a reflexive look at the production of scientific discourses by exploring the context and practice of political geography within the Francophone world. This article builds on the idea that the fundamental difference between Anglo and Francophone geographies relates to how theoretical writings and texts circulate, rather than to fundamental differences of content or topic. It examines how certain texts, ideas and thinkers have circulated, suggesting in particular 1 Dr Juliet J. Fall, Geography Discipline, The Open University, Walton Hall, Milton Keynes, MK7 6AA, jfall@open.ac.uk 2 that it is timely to reconsider Claude Raffestin's contributions on power, territory and territoriality. It argues that his critical theoretical framework, inspired by a number of authors including Michel Foucault, Henri Lefebvre and Luis Prieto has been overlooked by Francophone and Anglo geographers for a number of institutional, conceptual and personal factors. By focussing on institutional structure, the nature of the academy and styles of debate in the Francophone world, and in confronting Claude Raffestin to both John Allen and Yves Lacoste's geographies of power, this paper questions the divide between these two academic traditions.
Introduction and argument

« Au moment d'écrire le premier mot relatif au sujet qu'énonce le titre, je découvre mon «enfermement» dans des limites et des frontières mentales
car «penser» implique, ipso facto, un système de limites » (Raffestin 1981 : 119) This paper is an opportunity for a reflexive look at scientific discourses by considering the context within which political geographies are produced, providing substance to question the (re)construction of the discipline as an Anglo-American hegemonic project unaware of its internal cultural politics (Minca 2005; Samers 2005 ). Rather than a review of the literature on power within different political geographical traditions, I suggest engaging with the messiness of the varied thematic overlaps and contrasts in theoretical postures. Paasi most recently explored the uneven geographies of knowledge production within geography, noting most convincingly that "binary divisions, such as Anglophone versus the rest of the world, thus hide that these contexts are in themselves heterogeneous and modified by power geometries" (Paasi 2005 : 770;  see also Minca 2005) . This paper therefore particularly explores the Anglo-American and Francophone traditions, questioning "the persistence of a sort of 'parallel' geographical tradition that in France is still very much alive but (…) does not nurture a broad dialogue with the AngloAmerican ('international'?) geographical universe, although it continues to exert significant influence on a number of European geographies" (Minca 2000 : 286 ; see also Staszak 2001; Chivallon 2003; Besse 2004 ). Yet partly in response to Minca's brackets, I am happy to follow Paasi in arguing that what passes as international science is often nothing more than national confront Claude Raffestin's critical stance on political geography and geopolitics to that of Yves Lacoste. In opposing Raffestin's position developed within Géopolitique et Histoire to Lacoste's own reformulation of geopolitics within his editorials and pieces within the journal Hérodote, I
argue that the former presents a welcome critique of academic knowledge's instrumentalisation in furthering reactionary political ideologies. Throughout, these various approaches to geographical thinking are used to shed light on how Raffestin, Lacoste and some of their readers have approached space and power. Furthermore, by exploring how these various authors have considered boundaries, I suggest that this reflexive loop further illustrates the epistemological foundations, similarities and differences between these academic traditions. The difference between Anglo and Francophone geographies is therefore not one of content, since a full spectrum of political geographies ranging from realist to critical to social constructivist exist in both, but rather in how theoretical writings and texts circulate. I use political boundaries as indicators of this, much as keystone species are used in ecology to indicate the wider health or condition of an ecosystem.
Understanding the context: different approaches to theory and practice
The very different uses made of theory within Anglo and Francophone geography is well known.
The former is obsessed with it, the latter at times disparaging or dismissive. The consequence of this on the propagation of ideas within the academy, however, has been much less explored.
Instead, it has been assumed, from the outside, that Francophone geographies all share this idiosyncrasy. For example, in his review of Yves Lacoste's work -the self-proclaimed Doyen of the revival of French geopolitics -Hepple noted that the different role of theory appears a divide that seems hard to bridge: "for the Anglophone, the French geographers' neglect of their local post-structuralist social theorists seems perverse; on the other side, one suspects [they] are quite amused by this appeal of French social theorists, which they may well see as an ivory-tower distraction from serious geopolitical analysis (and possibly from serious politics too)" (Hepple 2000 : 294) . What Hepple fails to note is that in France these key authors would not even be called or considered post-structuralist at all, since labels and badges of belonging of this kind are largely absent (Chivallon 2003 )! The main crux of Hepple's comment, of course, is that while Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, Gilles Deleuze and others were becoming unavoidable in universities within the Anglo world, "their names were being systematically eclipsed in France" 3 (Cusset 2003 : 22) . This absence is especially striking within geography: heralded as manna in the various foci of Anglo geography, these authors are practically absent in Francophone geographical circles. As two members of the established clique put it simply: "the French critical philosophy of the 60s and 70s is less popular in France and the Latin countries than in the United States -Barthes and Derrida are not quoted; the interest in Foucault is more evident" (Claval and Staszak 2004 : 319 ; see also Lussault 2003; Söderström & Philo 2004; Collignon 2004; Dupont 2004; , or the more general Lotringer & Cohen 2001) . In contrast to this endorsement in Anglo social science, Francophone geography has largely turned its back on this phenomenon.
In his review of French radical politics, and referring to the interview of Michel Foucault carried out in the first issue of Hérodote, Yves Lacoste's journal and personal fiefdom, Hepple (2000) suggests it "does highlight the convergence between Foucauldian thought and the geopolitical perspectives of the Hérodote group well before Foucault's impact on the construction of Anglophone critical geopolitics by Dalby, Ò Tuathail and other [sic] in later years" (Hepple 2000 : 292; see also Ò Tuathail 1994 : 326) . I would suggest that Hepple and Ò Tuathail's attempts to see links here are somewhat misplaced. There was indeed a substantial and early impact of social theory within Francophone geography, but not within Lacoste's circles. Instead, this took place in Switzerland, outside the bounded confines of Franco-French debates within the work of Claude
Raffestin. Yet he is, in a sense, a lost geographer. He is infrequently cited within Francophone geographies and is much more likely to be quoted in Italy, Spain or South America where his work has been translated and enthusiastically picked up. In the next section, I explore what Raffestin's particular geography of power consisted of and why this should be taken seriously. I then discuss how he was received by reading a number of contemporary book reviews that shed light on the debates within geography at the time. was (…) to be found in the work of the Swiss geographer Claude Raffestin. Being rather idiosyncratic, his social geography was difficult to categorize in the neat boxes traditionally used to describe English-speaking geography (terms such as spatial analysis, humanistic geography, and radical geography)" (Söderström & Philo 2004 : 304-305) . The decisive factors of his nonemergence are therefore both institutional and thematic. Raffestin attempted to endorse the role of senior theoretician in the linguistic and constructivist turn the discipline took at the end of the Seventies, in a context where the dominant but battered Ecole de géographie française remained overwhelmingly in debt to the classical Vidalian tradition: much more likely to describe than theorise. Thus in contrast to the many neorealists within Francophone geography, he responded to the lancing problem of the reality clause of geographical objects by engaging in what has been called a metaphysical quest for géographicité (Orain 2003 : 339) , adopting an unashamedly social constructivist posture (see also Racine 2002 . Amongst other ambitions, he sought to formalise a theory of territory and territoriality within a clearly foucaldian framework of power relations strongly influenced by La Volonté de Savoir published in 1976. This was not a finished theory, reflecting his rejection of closed systems and his personal attachement to a pensée en procès in which a framework was attained through successive approximations (Raffestin 1980 : 44) . The book was inevitably a bit of a hotchpotch with methodological chapters ranging from explaining what a geographical problématique should be, to theoretical contributions on a relational approach to power and space 5 . This set the groundwork for his nascent theory of territory and territoriality. As he spun his framework, metaphorically following the fragile string a geographical Ariadne seemed to suggest (Raffestin 1980 : 1), Raffestin explored his proposals within a series of chapters on population and resources, adding touches of colour to his theory through short examples. While empirically often unconvincing, it did map out both a theoretical paradigm on power and space and a innovative draft methodology for applying it.
Raffestin wrote beautifully, making use of a breadth of references and myths:
"power, a common noun, hides behind Power, a proper noun. It hides so efficiently specifically because it is present everywhere. It is present in every relation, within every action: it insidiously uses every social fracture to infiltrate into the heart of people. It is ambiguous because there is Power and there is power. But the former is easier to grasp because it manifests itself through complex apparatuses that surround and grasp each territory, control the population and dominate the resources. It is visible, massive, identifiable power. In consequence it is dangerous and unsettling, but it inspires wariness through the very threat that it represents. But the most dangerous is that which is unseen or that which one no longer sees because it is assumed to be discarded through house arrest. It would be too simple if Power were the Minotaur locked into its labyrinth that Theseus could kill once and for all. But power is reborn worse than it was, when Theseus meets the Minotaur: Power is dead, long live power. From then on, power is assured to live forever as it is no longer visible; instead it is consubstantial to all relations" 6 (Raffestin 1980 : 45) .
As this short extract illustrates, Foucault's definitions of power as developed in La Volonté de Savoir largely underpinned Raffestin's approach (see also Raffestin 2006) . Initially, spatiality of power was implied rather than explicitly carved out. Sweeping away any temptation of equating all power with the state, he interpreted Foucault's idea of a network to mean that power was the dynamic basis of relations of force that, through their intrinsic inequality, constantly created states of power [états de pouvoir] that were both local and instable (Raffestin 1980 : 45) . Each relation was the place [le lieu] within which power manifested itself, as energy and information got manipulated that is to say formed, accumulated, combined and circulated (Raffestin 1980 : 46 Glucksmann (1977) to reinforce the links between energy / information / power / knowledge. He suggested that these four notions could be bound together by considering the role of work [travail] . This notion of work rested both rather confusingly on the Marxist idea that alienation through work decayed all other social relations, and the notion that power, via work, came from the bottom up. The possibility of power, then, and not power itself, rested on the appropriation of work taken to be informed energy (Raffestin 1980 : 50) . In formalising this, he drew on communication theory to design figures with boxes and arrows, representing actors, strategies and relations drawn to suggest rough sketches and attempts at formalisation, rather than figures set in stone 9 . What was perhaps most intriguing in Raffestin's discussion of power was how space was, at least initially, only hinted at and not dissected directly.
It was in discussing territory that his proposal took on more tangible spatial dimensions. Like his conception of power, Raffestin's concept of territory drew upon Lefebvre's idea of the production of space in order to spatialise his relational approach. Territory, in his perspective, was the space [travail] within which work (or energy and information) had been projected and that in consequence was constructed through and revealed power relations (Raffestin 1980 : 129) .
In this, his distinction between space (pre-existent to any action) and territory (produced relationally) was fundamental. For Raffestin, "space is the 'original prison', while territory is the prison that men design for themselves" 10 (Raffestin 1980 : 129 Agnew 2001 : 4). Raffestin's focus, however, was almost exclusively on territory as the site of all social and spatial relations, and territoriality as the expression of these (power) relations.
Following René Girard, territory acted as mediator in relations between people (Raffestin 1980 : 144) .
Who read Pour une Géographie du Pouvoir?
It is often instructive to go back and explore what was being said about a book at the time of its publication, shedding light as much on the particular epoch as on the piece. At the end of the 1970s and the early 1980s, academic geography in France was undergoing violent and highly personalised fistfights and struggles (Orain 2003 : 267; Clout 1985) in which official national geographical institutions such as the Comité National de Géographie were seen as nothing less than the "hateful emanation of an over-hierarchical system of mandarins that systematically marginalised progressive groups, specifically financially" 11 (Orain 2003 : 264) . The time, called a decade of ferment by Buléon (1992) Some of these were pretty savage by Francophone standards, in a context where debates, by being more highly personalised are often more guarded and rarely as public as within the Anglo world.
In a piece in Population, on the periphery of geography, Le Bras's (1981) comments reflected the division of geography into opposing schools, illustrating the need to chose one or the other camp.
In rejecting the book as uninteresting, he suggested its novelty was only apparent since rather than using robust statistical methods and developing a "way of thinking about uniformity and totality that rests on linear algebra and classical statistics" (Le Bras 1981 : 1201 , Raffestin preferred "a way of thinking based on random events and discontinuities, the best expression of which is catastrophe theory. What one calls the l'Ecole française de géographie, founded by Vidal de Lablache [sic] and extending to the 'possibilistes' can be assigned to that category.
Despite claiming to break away from this, Cl. Raffestin is in fact an heir of this tradition" 12 (Le Bras 1981 : 1201 ). Raffestin's ambition of establishing a theoretically-informed geography was cast aside with a disparaging brush of the hand. The critique was little more than petty posturing and point scoring. What was more interesting, in retrospect, was how little Raffestin's project of introducing social theories of power into geography was read on its own terms. While this seems surprising now, particularly in the Anglo context of a ubiquity of social theory, it was not unexpected at the time. Commenting, in another context, on French geography in the late Seventies, Lévy wrote that "I was struck by the serious lack of culture of the existing geographical circles, combined with an even stranger superiority complex towards existing philosophical texts and debates" 13 (Lévy 1995 : 520) . More cautiously, Paul Claval in a characteristically kind understatement suggested that, at the time, "geography as taught in the majority of departments was not at the vanguard of radical French intellectual culture" (Claval 2000 : 240) .
Paul Claval, already at the time a grand figure of French geography, suggested in Political Geography Quarterly that while Raffestin's book was not without merit, it failed to explain itself clearly: "he does not construct a scheme for explaining the diversity of social and political architectures as well as the differences in the role of power according to technical levels and ideologies. As the titles [sic] makes explicit, this book is more a plea for a new approach to political geography than a structured presentation of what it can be" (Claval 1983 : 94) . Noting rather bluntly that "this approach is akin to Marxist ones -and Raffestin gives many references to
Lefèbvre" (Claval 1983 : 94) , he sought to categorise the work according to that scheme, rather than engaging with the profoundly Foucauldian approach to power. He wrote that "Raffestin is mainly interested […] by the control system linked to power, and by relations between the centre and the periphery, areas and nodes, networks and circulations" (Claval 1983 : 94) , approaching it as though it were simply a descriptive filter rather than a theoretical posture. Similarly, le Bras recognised that the Foucauldian approach was innovative… but ultimately useless: "The term 'power' is used in line with Michel Foucault. By its dissymmetry, any relation is analysed as a relation of strength, as violence as Marx would say. The reading made of Foucault is prodigiously stimulating but it doesn't provide operational tools, no measure of power, no objective identification of its effects. Power, like physicists' ether or the phlogiston of chemists is consubstantial to all relations, but is also impossible to separate one from another, it's impossible to isolate it and therefore to map it precisely" 14 (Le Bras 1981 : 1201 . Villeneuve made a similar point: Raffestin "could be accused of practising political determinism when he argues that power is consubstantial to all relations" 15 (Villeneuve 1982 : 266) . Ether was obviously a curiously geographical obsession since it also appeared in Villeneuve's review when he said, more positively, that the book was liberating "not because it is high-flying, in the ethereal air of abstract concepts, but because it plunges deeply into the hidden structures of power"
16 (Villeneuve 1982 : 266) . Le Bras's obsession with mapping was interesting, reflecting again the prevalence of the map as an end in itself, as the ultimate fetish that distinguished geographers from other scientists. Sanguin made a similar comment in a review article of Raffestin (1980) and Paul Claval's rather different book Espace et Pouvoir (1978) , allowing himself a little flutter of emotion: "Paradoxically these works, written by two reputed geographers, are indeed publications without any maps!" (Sanguin 1983 : 325) , an apparent paradox to him which appeared all the more condemnably ungeographic in view of the objects considered. Likewise, Lacoste also reviewed the two books together in his vicious review in Hérodote, echoing Sanguin in writing that "it must be said that these geographers, even if they take pleasure in speaking about power, refuse to observe it as geographers and especially to refer to the specifically geographical way of seeing, the major epistemological characteristic: maps!" 17 (Lacoste 1981 : 155) . Likewise, for Sanguin, power relationships that "lie beyond the bounds of cartography" (Sanguin 1983 : 325) led to a dialectic that was "somewhat abstract and [within which] the thought is essentially theoretical" (Sanguin 1983 : 324) , a grave sin indeed . Thus, by moving away from mapping, Raffestin was identified as a traitor: "whilst abundantly exploiting aspects of anthropology, sociology and political science, [he] tend[s] to leave geography somewhat in the shadows" (Sanguin 1983 : 326 Claval's book (1978) , noting cautiously that "despite the great interest of these books, they were scarcely taken up, perhaps because they cumulated two opposite handicaps. On one hand, they were too advanced for their readers, handling concepts perceived to be too abstract, too far from usual research fields; on the other they continued to approach politics indirectly, a topic that remains the real blind spot of the geographical Weltanshauung. In that, they gave up creating a political geography based on a clear epistemological and theoretical basis. This is true for France and for other Latin countries, because within the Anglophone world throughout the 1980s political geography has softly conquered a significant place within the discipline" 20 (Lévy 2003 : 738) . He remained unconvinced by Raffestin's uses of Foucault, noting that pouvoir was neither a category nor a social science concept, but instead only a linguistic category, upstream epistemologically from the politique, a notion he had personally favoured (Lévy 1994 commented that "the only problem here is that Raffestin draws back from elaborating his theoretical problematic to the point where the emergence, logic, and trajectory of power relation in human society become analytically determinate and historically comprehensible" (Scott 1982 : 131) . Thus "Raffestin's abstract transactional approach to the geography of power denies him the potential richness and insights of this latter mode of investigation, and instead encourages him to dissipate his theoretical energies in the construction of simple and, in the end, rather uninformative structural models of symmetric and dissymmetric power relations" (Scott 1982 : 132) . In other words, he does not develop both an archaeology and/or a genealogy of spatial power clearly enough to be useful. Instead, writes Scott, it is "perhaps less far from the universe of discourse of classical political geography than its author might wish (above all in view of its finally encyclopaedic treatment of political and geographical relata)" (Scott 1982 : 132) , a comment that echoes Le Bras. More recently, Buléon suggested similarly that instead of a protean conception of power, a clearer "relationship of power and politics in specific historical contexts has to be appropriately apprehended. It also means that Raffestin is entirely correct when he attempts a generalizing, integrating approach, as the only means whereby one can read the social whole; however this approach should not necessarily be present in the exploration of every sphere of activity, in our case the political, as would be necessary in the case of the economy" (Buléon 1992 : 31) . While many of these comments seem harsh, the number of distinguished geographers reading him was in itself interesting. Raffestin was certainly read but was largely discarded.
It is not always easy to read Raffestin, as his theory of territory and territoriality and his wider writings on the geographical intelligibility of reality are often put forward more as proposals than polished theories. Orain notes for instance that "his production has the character of a slowly built up mosaic in which each text takes its place as a piece, both a device and a process. It is a device in that each piece of writing refers to other contemporary ones, edging them on and adding elements through partial repetitions that can be easily pieced together" 21 (Orain 2003 : 315) . It has seemed at times, to those around Raffestin, that he has always been waiting for a disciple to take on this role of polishing his proposals, yet on a personal level he has done his best to crucify anyone who might have tried. At the University of Geneva, several doctoral students did apply his framework to topics as varied as Alpine territoriality, landscape literature or graphical semiotics, but they subsequently largely remained in Geneva and published neither widely nor in
English. More surprisingly, his own sources of inspiration such as Foucault, Heidegger, Lefebvre were not picked up; at most, the orthodox raffestinian reading of these was reproduced. This is of course where the peripheral nature of Swiss geography shows its limitations: Raffestin's lack of insertion into certain guarded circles of French geography certainly did not help spread his oeuvre. However, having said that, a number of links did exist and continue, in particular inserting geographers working in Geneva into networks centred on universities and laboratoires in France, in particular at Grenoble and Pau. Raffestin has also made a substantial impact on Italian geographies (Minca 2005) , perhaps even more than on Francophone geographies, although a review of this is outside the scope of this paper. He currently spends most of his time in Turin.
Regards croisés
Twenty years after Raffestin's attempts to adapt Foucault, Lefebvre and Deleuze to geographical theory within a relational framework, John Allen published his Lost Geographies of Power. He assumed, like Raffestin and also following Foucault, that power rather than being all encompassing was "a relational effect of social interaction" (Allen 2003 : 2) . However, he specified that "people are placed by power, but they experience it at first hand through the rhythms and relationships of particular places, not as some pre-packaged force from afar and not as a ubiquitous presence" (Allen 2003 : 2) . It is this, he argued, that had been lost within geographical thought. The real 'power' of power, for Allen, was visible in the interplay of forces in place, as the presence of power was mediated in space and time. This was not so different from
Raffestin's proposal that place mediates power relations between individuals. In fact, at times, Allen appears to echo Raffestin in an uncanny way, while at others he clearly disagrees with what ironically is certainly, at least to him, a totally Lost Geography. Allen suggested that Foucault and Deleuze's approaches to power fell short of a real appreciation of the inherent spatiality of power, including the fact that spatiality was inherently imbued with power (Allen 2003 : 8) .
Thus, he wrote, "even if we accept Foucault's immanent conception of power, as I broadly do, it is important to bear in mind -lest we lose sight of it -that power relations have long been experienced through a variety of different modes and that they are always already spatial" (Allen 2003 : 10) . This implied broadening Foucault and Deleuze's notions that "subjects are constituted by the spacing and timing of their own practices as much as they are by those who seek to shape their conduct" (Allen 2003 : 9) . Thus, in contrast to Raffestin's initial formalised and largely aspatial figures, Allen was intent on grasping the full materiality and rootedness of power from the very beginning. Power, therefore, was not reduced to "some facile notion that it is a shadowy force lurking in the murky recesses" (Allen 2003 : 9) . Instead, the very concrete spaces of the everyday were considered as sites "through which subjectivity is immanently produced" (Allen 2003 : 9) .
In grasping the particular ways in which power takes effect spatially, Allen found it useful to distinguish the particularly spatialities of authority, coercion, seduction and manipulation, something that Raffestin very clearly rejected from the outset as simple differences of means, not nature (Raffestin 1980 : 47) . Allen, for instance, very clearly argued against a conception of power as 'capacity', writing that such a conception led to ideas where, at worst, "power is conceived as something which radiates out from an identifiable centre, triggering an effective capacity for control. Once you have the measure of power and a grasp of its capacity to administer, control and fix a territory and its population, the rest, it seems, amounts to little more than a series of footnotes from the centre" (Allen 2003 : 17) . This off-hand comment appeared to be an echo and partial refutation of Raffestin's chapter on Dénombrement et pouvoir which claimed to explore how populations were involved in relations of power simultaneously as stake
[enjeu], resource and actor, yet turned into little more than a call to understanding the strategic role of population censuses. Likewise, both authors had very similar takes on the asymmetries of power relations. For Raffestin, while 'zero-sum' games -one in which the scores of the 'winner'
and 'loser' sum to zero -might have appeared frequent, these were not in fact very prevalent in human relations (Raffestin 1980 : 51) , something with which Allen largely agreed, drawing additionally on Weber (1978 in Allen 2003 .
However, despite many overlaps, Allen's basic issue with capacity was perhaps the strongest critique that could be levelled at Raffestin (see also Sayer 2004)
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. In summing up his argument, Allen unknowingly put his finger on the limitations of the latter's framework revolving around population / territory / resources: "the so-called 'capacity' of power is often a euphemism for the resources and abilities which may or may not be mobilized to produce an effect -be it domination, authority, seduction, manipulation, coercion, inducement or whatever. Resources move and can be lost and may simply evaporate, but power has none of those qualities" (Allen 2003 : 36) . Allen was most innovative in interrogating the spatial effects of the different modalities of power (see Cidell 2005 : 231; Ogborn 2004) , understanding the "embodied clashes over the inscribed meaning of space" (Allen 2003 : 170) and the tensions evident between those who inhabit places. He pointed to the different ways in which power was exercised from domination through manipulation to seduction and even down to coercion. This, wrote Allen, "is not because power is endowed with some kind of vapid plurality, where the different modalities take it in turn to act out their display. On the contrary, it is the nature of the places themselves, how they are constituted through the practice and rhythms of the different groups which inhabit them, which gives rise to tangled arrangements of power and their execution" (Allen 2003 : 171) .
Thus by focussing on what he called a topological view of space, where power works through the play of proximity and distance, he created a non-scalar view of the dynamism of place, bringing elsewhere into immediate presence or distance. Echoing Le Bras' earlier comment, Allen was also dismissing power as a sort of metaphoric phlogiston, choosing instead to encounter it within concrete physical or material dispositifs. These different engagements with the modalities of power can be touched upon by examining how both have explored boundaries as particular geographical objects.
Territory, boundaries and territoriality
Raffestin wrote extensively on boundaries, first in his book Géographie des Frontières (1974) , written with Paul Guichonnet, and subsequently in various articles and book chapters Building on the idea that boundaries (limites) were the expression of a bio-social interface that was historically contingent and therefore subject to continual redefinition, he suggested that when boundaries became fixed (crystallisées) they became ideological in that they expressed the existing relations of power territorially (Raffestin 1980 : 149) . Thus every territorial grid or territory was "simultaneously the expression of a social project that was the result of relations of production that are created within the means of production and the ideological field present within any given relation" 23 (Raffestin 1980 : 149) . Boundaries were taken to be information structuring a territory, requiring energy to be maintained: "we no longer make sacrifices to Terminus, the god that watches over boundaries, but modern states still circle their territories with limits, often heavily materialised and sometimes hard to cross" 24 (Raffestin 1981 : 125) .
Obviously any idea of a 'natural' boundary was discarded through the appeal to their essential historicité: naturalizing them would assume negating their historical contingency, different from the purely arbitrary. Instead they were born of and reflected social projects. Raffestin drew very heavily on semiotics in discussing boundaries, taking them to be a specific kind of sign (signe).
The most innovative aspect of his writings on boundaries appeared when he linked boundaries to his concept of territoriality: boundaries were lived and experienced as part of the socio-spatial framework, part of the multidimensionality of the territorial experience of members of a collectivité. He wrote that the principles of "translation, regulation, differentiation and relation are the principles that are always contained within boundaries or frontiers. (Raffestin 1990 : 301) . The definition of the Other by boundaries was taken to be a two way game: boundaries contained difference just as difference constructed boundaries. Because this idea of differentiation was inherently contained within the idea of territoriality, being the sum of relations with both alterity (otherness) and exteriority, Raffestin sought to explore it further, advancing by repetitive touches and slow brush-strokes within various consecutive papers:
"Boundaries are differentiation. They always found difference, the disappearance of which leads to crisis. Throughout history, the transcending (franchissement) of boundaries has almost always led to explosions of violence, and it is precisely because indispensable difference was negated on that occasion. Redrawing the line is akin to finding differentiation again and re-establishing order. No material or spiritual activity can do without a system of boundaries. This necessary differentiation does not imply that boundaries be always stable, but it implies that there will always be boundaries, even if what is defined as different may vary. Chaos is indifferentiation, it is the absence of boundaries. It is easy to see the link between boundaries and value. The boundary is a ubiquitous notion; it is an absolutely indispensable invariant, in the real sense of the word. We could even say that -and in that we would agree with those calling for an erasure of borders -it doesn't matter what boundaries there are, provided there are some… It is easy to see how the differentiation that is contained within boundaries leads to a theory of culture. Finally, all culture -in the anthropological sense of the term -is an enacted theory (théorie en actes) of boundaries" 26 (Raffestin 1990 : 300) .
This attempt to create a theory of boundaries as part of a wider theory of territoriality involved weaving together their different functions and principles. However, it was never fully finished to a point where Raffestin was satisfied. At most, he suggested that since boundaries defined spatio-temporal containers, their inscription and functional significance were both instrumental to and stemmed from power relations and enshrined or imposed a given territoriality through a series of instruments and codes . While this might seem rather cryptic, it was not unlike 'Open walls' rather than 'enclosed worlds' is perhaps a more apt metaphorical redescription of such places (…) and such interactions, I would argue, disrupt any easy cultural mapping of who is close at hand and who is distant, who belongs and who does not" (Allen 2003 : 174) .
Both authors were interested in the actual regulation of social spaces. Allen referred to the different mechanisms of regulation, exploring examples of indirect or shallow ways that could be used to achieve different levels of enclosure, emphasising that the (in)directness of the regulation implied different spatial configurations such as domination / seduction etc. Raffestin tried to pin down the idea of regulation by referring to the semiotics of space, suggesting a two-way relationship between changes in the signifiant (the spatial inscription of a boundary) and/or its signifié (the functions it is made to reflect). Changes in either/both implied a modification of territoriality. Conversely, changing the instruments and codes led to changes in territoriality and boundaries . Exploring the forces producing social space, Allen noted similarly that "the different arrangements of power take their shape from the placement of forces and their relational ties (…) the mutability of power differs in line with the differences between places, in terms of their uses, attachments, codes and relationships" (Allen 2003 : 178) . However, in concluding his exploration of power and boundaries, Allen made an important nuance that Raffestin would not have made: "but, and this is an important but, in so far as each and every relationship is not a relationship of power, so each and every place is not continuously marked by the presence of power" (Allen 2003 : 178) .
What these regards croisés have sought to show is how broadly similar Raffestin and Allen's approaches to space and boundaries actually were. Referring back to the earlier reviews of and new faculty in the department of geography at the University of Geneva are also grounded in similar paradigms (Debarbieux 1999) . However, these groups are mainly made up of researchers in their thirties and forties, only appointed to full professorships in the past few years. The established clique and the older generation are still involved in other battles.
Institutional structures and the circulation of ideas
Part of the lack of impact of this work is to be found in the structure of the French academy, requiring a brief comment. This is broadly not a system designed for rapid innovation or the rise of freethinkers -innovation for innovation's sake is scorned upon and pointed out as something uniquely Anglo and therefore intrinsically suspect (Cusset 2003 : 230) . It is also different from the much more decentralised structures prevalent in other French-speaking contexts such as Switzerland or Quebec. In comparison to British or North American contexts, the French geographical world is like a small family within which -as one geographer put it -il faut montrer patte blanche (Chivallon, 2005, pers. comm.) , that is to say that individual acceptance is obtained by demonstrating one's worth, as in many exclusive peer groups, as well as by conforming and not sticking out too much. Paradoxically, however, or maybe in consequence of this hierarchical system, 'belonging' to a particular school of thinking is not highly regarded in
France -in contrast, I would suggest, to the Anglo world -and instead being 'outside' and 'unclassifiable' is valued (Lévy & Debarbieux 2004, pers.comm.; Chivallon 1999 and 2005, pers.comm.) . Anything identified as jargon is savagely frowned upon. Likewise, labels ('postmodern', 'postructuralist', 'constructivist', 'feminist' and so on), are seen to enclose and are largely rejected in France (Chivallon in Antheaume et al. 2004 : 13) and sometimes feared.
Indeed, in another piece, Chivallon writes that "it is scarcely possible to speak of 'postmodern geography' in France without suspicion of scientific heresy" (Chivallon 2003 : 406) . As Bourdieu (1984) has noted, this need to position oneself within the academia has an important effect on how ideas are spread and appropriated, relating to the varying visibility of different thinkers.
Another substantial difference in France is the rarity of public debates, partly due to the absence of recent paradigmatic change, due mainly to reduced generational renewal. This institutional fixity has largely contributed to a certain climate of comfortable conformity and the corresponding strategy of remaining within the accepted pré carré, the designated field assigned to the discipline, rather than seeking inspiration from the outside -such as from social theorists.
This may well be simply a current trend linked to individual waves of recruitment, as the current pattern is in contrast to more vivid debates in the Seventies and Eighties pitching the Nouvelle Géographie against established conservative paradigms (Chivallon 2005, pers.comm.) .
In consequence of this highly codified French system, the smaller, marginal or peripheral schools in Switzerland and Quebec have sometimes acted as catalysts and innovators, largely simply by staying outside of partisan politics in France. In the past thirty years, many French academics have moved to Switzerland, for instance, not only lured by the substantially higher salaries and better material conditions, but also for the perceived intellectual freedom, rejoining what Söderström rather prettily described as an "archipelago of thinkers" 27 (Söderström 2004, pers. comm.) , very different from the centralised French system of large centrally-funded laboratoires. Lacoste's review of the book (Lacoste 1981) indicated the shift in their proximity and the beginning of the feud. Subsequently, Raffestin wrote vociferously that Lacoste's endeavours were much closer to the (wrong) end of the political spectrum, with recent dangerously nationalist and populist surges (Raffestin 1995 : 290-304 (Claval 2000 : 252) .
But he also wrote that "the renewed interest in political geography was not limited to left-wing geographers, for in the period between 1975 and 1980, for instance, new contributions to the field of geopolitics were proposed by André-Louis Sanguin (1977 ), Paul Claval (1978 and Claude Raffestin (1980) " (Claval 2000 : 261) . Notwithstanding Lacoste's own dubious position on such a spectrum, the question one longs to ask is quite where Claval would place Raffestin. What was interesting here, of course, was that this left/right spectrum mattered in France in a way that it didn't in Anglo political geography where radicalism was (ostensibly) the benchmark and academics tried terribly hard to be more radical than their proverbial neighbours. Claval's attempts from the inside to explain away the divide only served to further stress its fundamental importance (see also Claval 2003 ). Hepple's analysis of Lacoste within the same book was however much more nuanced. He identified Lacoste's initial and laudable ambition of putting his finger on "a serious lack of 'epistemological reflection' [that] had blinded French geography to the ways in which the subject had been constructed in a narrow and emasculated fashion" (Hepple 2000 : 272) . This was undoubtedly necessary at a time when the overwhelmingly Vidalian descriptive traditions was still rampant, and -to push the hopelessly macho imagery still Raffestin's critique was aimed at those who saw geography as a strategic decision-making tool.
In a particularly self-satisfied article -and one that directly quoted Raffestin to discard himBéatrice Giblin, one of the members of Lacoste's clique, wrote for instance that academic geography and political geography were quite simply 'lost on Sirius' (Giblin 1985 : 285) 
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, the French equivalent of running off with the fairies
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. In response, Raffestin noted that this perfidious stance was "not simply a question of putting oneself purely at the service of the powerful, but rather of marrying science and politics, of knowing how to create a political tool for rulers. Here, we are faced with the permanence of one of the characteristics of the former geopolitics, systematically subservient to political power" 36 (Raffestin 1995 : 298 ; see Lacoste's response 2001 : 12) . Lacoste brushed away such critiques by arguing that his apolitical, 'scientific' raisonnement géographique protected him from the peril of ideological slippage (Ò Tuathail 1994 and Hepple 2000 : 281 also make this point), as did -one is tempted to add -his former veneer of radicalism. He increasingly referred to his group as a nationally based school, writing that "geopolitical reasoning, at least that which characterises what can from now on be called the French School of Geopolitics, is methodical and rigorous" 37 (Lacoste 2001 : 7) , stating that no other country than France had such a competent body of scientists that could produce analyses "based on a sufficiently solid and diverse scientific basis" 38 (Lacoste 2001 : 8) , except in some (unspecified) countries where they might be located within the Ministries of Defence or of Foreign Affairs (Lacoste 2001 : 8) , indicating directly how close to state power he thought geopolitics should be. Raffestin showed convincingly that this was nothing new: just the resurgence of the old geopolitical Beast. The geographer, once again, was deluding himself in serving the Prince, congratulating himself on his (largely-imaginary) strategic importance.
Conclusions
In this paper, I have offered a reflexive, and subjective, look at the production of scientific which examples were more likely than not to concern nation-states, despite his overt articulation that this was not the only scale at which power was manifest. Following this, I briefly confronted Claude Raffestin's wider approach to the practice of geography by contrasting his critical stance on political geography and geopolitics to that of his nemesis Yves Lacoste. In opposing his critique developed within Géopolitique et Histoire to Lacoste's own reformulation of geopolitics, I argued that his position presented a very necessary critique of reactionary political ideologies that continue to gain popularity in a world shaken in its certainties.
The various analyses of different approaches to geographical thinking were used throughout to shed light on how Raffestin, Lacoste and some of their critiques and readers approached space and power. Furthermore, by briefly exploring how these various authors considered boundaries, I
suggested that this continuous reflexive loop further illustrated the particular epistemological foundations and differences between these academic discourses. Throughout, it emerged that the main difference between Anglo and Francophone geographies was not one of content, since the full spectrum of political geographies -from realist to critical or social constructivist -existed in both, but rather in how certain theoretical writings and texts have circulated and been picked up.
The danger of focussing on the personal stories and vendettas, on the buzz of what so often turns into little more than academic gossip and feuds, is to get caught up in them and to have to chose sides. This camp mentality is somewhat waning in the Francophone world yet the lack of any accepted ritualised spaces or national fora for what should be stimulating debates continues to cause concern, and most journals continue to be house journals of individual departments, reflecting the local hegemony. In contrast to the petty warfare, I keep in mind Raffestin's healthy and very Sartrian approach to criticism that requires an author not to listen to critiques and be hurt by them, but instead demands of them to write 200 pages in response to any disagreement.
Raffestin's Pour une géographie du pouvoir was such an attempt, as was his later Géopolitique et histoire. If geography is to take its desire to create a global space of debate seriously, then further engagement with this literature both within and outside the Francophone world will be necessary.
